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NOTE
Employment Discrimination-Pregnancy Discrimination Against
Male Employees: Extending the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act to Employees' Dependents
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex.' In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), thereby amending Title VII to provide that sex
discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 2 The3
Fourth Circuit in Newport News Shiobuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
and the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Lockheed Missile & Space Co.4 have

reached radically different results concerning the scope of the PDA and its
effect on prior Title VII law. This note discusses each court's analysis and
considers the relative merits of their conclusions.
In 1976 the Supreme Court in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert5 held that an

employer did not violate Title VII by providing disability insurance benefits to
all employees, but excluding from the plan's coverage disabilities arising from
pregnancy. 6 The Court found that such an exclusion was not per se genderbased discrimination and caused no gender-based discriminatory effect. 7 The

1. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV
1980)). See infra text accompanying note 12 for the text of the PDA.
3. 667 F.2d 448, af'dpercuriam on rehearingen bane, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.), cer. granted,
103 S. Ct. 487 (1982).
4. 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
5. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
6. Id. at 127-28. General Electric provided nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits
to all its employees, but denied all claims arising out of an absence from work due to pregnancy.
Female employees whose claims for pregnancy disability benefits had been denied brought a class
action against General Electric seeking a declaration that the plan constituted sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII. The district court held that the plan was discriminatory. 375 F. Supp.
367 (E.D. Va. 1974). The court of appeals affirmed. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
7. 429 U.S. at 136-39. The Gilbert Court cited Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(disability plan established under California law excluding pregnancy benefits held not violative
of equal protection clause), as support for its holding. 429 U.S. at 134 (citing 417 U.S. at 496
n.20). Classifying employees on the basis of sex and then treating each class differently is per se
discrimination. Geduldig had distinguished two such sex dixcrimination cases: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 667 (1973) (requirement that servicewomen prove that they supported husbands
in order to receive spousal medical benefits, while servicemen automatically entitled to benefits for
dependents), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statutory preference for naming men rather
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plan did not constitute gender-based discrimination since pregnancy classifications do not divide the favored and disfavored groups on the basis of gender.
Rather, the plan put pregnant women in one class and "non-pregnant persons" of both sexes in the other.8 The plan had no discriminatory effect since
there was no proof that the plan was worth more to men than to women.9 In
so holding, the Court refused to follow the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) guidelines on the issue' and overruled the unanimous
conclusion of the six circuit courts that had considered the question.'I
In response to the Gilbert decision, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which added the following subsection:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because or on the basis of pregnancy, childthan women as estate administrators). A facially neutral classification may still violate Title VII if
the effect of the classification is to discriminate against members of one class. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. 429 U.S. at 135. In determining whether the plan constituted sex based discrimination,
the Gilbert Court used the equal protection analysis of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In
Geduldig, the Court held that California's exclusion of pregnancy benefits from a disability program did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Gilbert Court
approvingly read Geduldig as holding that a pregnancy based exclusion "is not a gender based
discrimination at all," 429 U.S. at 136, and quoted the Geduldig opinion extensively: "'The lack
of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such. . . becomes clear upon the most
cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes.'" 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting 417 U.S. at 496-97). For an analysis of the Geduldig
decision, see Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifcationsandthe Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441 (1975).
9. 429 U.S. at 139. The Court reasoned that pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an
additional risk to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the
presumed parity of the evenhanded inclusion of risks. For discussions of the cases that decided
claims of pregnancy-based discrimination prior to the PDA, see Barkett, Pregnancy Discrimination-Purpose,Effect, and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 401 (1978); Ginsburg, Gender
and the Constitution, 44 CIN. L. REv. 1 (1975); Note, The IrrationalTrend Toward Mandatory
Maternity Coverage, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 758 (1977); Note, Title VII, Pregnancy andDisabilityPayments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 381 (1976); Note, Gender-BasedDis.
criminationAfter GilbertandSatty, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 459 (1979). For commentaries on
the PDA and its effect on Title VII law, see Coffin, The 1978 Pregnancy DiscriminationAct: A
Problem of Interpretation, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 607 (1980); Thomas, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employee DisabilityBenefit Programs: Title VII and EqualProtection ClauseAnalysis, 60
OR. L. REV. 249 (1981); Comment, The 1978Amendment to Title VII The Legislative Reaction to
the Geduldig - Gilbert - Satty Pregnancy Exclusion Problems in Disability Benefits Programs, 27
Loy. L. REV. 532 (1981).
10. 429 U.S. at 140-45. The EEOC was established to interpret and administer Title VII.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (1976). The EEOC publishes guidelines that reflect the
agency's interpretation of the controlling statutes. The guidelines do not have the force of law, but
are entitled to consideration by the courts. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971). The Gilbert Court found that the EEOC guidelines which treated prepnancy discrimination as sex discrimination were in conflict with what the Court termed the "plain
meaning" of the statute. 429 U.S. at 140-41, 145.
11. Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429
U.S. 744 (1976); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1975), modfied, 434 U.S. 136
(1976); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976);
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); Communications Workers v. American Tel. &
Tel., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 744 (1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated onjurisdictionalgrounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
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birth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
12
work ....

Exactly what was left of Gilbert was unclear. It was clear, however, that discriminatory treatment of employees based on pregnancy was sex discrimination under the law.
The reach of the PDA has become a central issue in a similar employment
situation: if an employer extends medical insurance coverage to employees'
spouses, does limiting or excluding benefits for spouses' pregnancy-related expenses violate Title VII as amended by the PDA? The answer depends on the
courts' construction of the PDA. One construction, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed, is that the PDA does not extend protection to dependents,
but provides only that employers may not discriminate against women employees on the basis of pregnancy. 13 An alternate construction, adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in Newport News, is that the PDA renders discrimination on
14
the basis of pregnancy sex discrimination for all Title VII purposes.
The issue was first presented in Newport News. The company provided a
health insurance plan for its employees' dependents, but limited the pregnancy-related hospital benefits. 15 A male employee, having incurred expenses
in connection with the birth of his child, filed a charge with the EEOC alleging
that the company's limitation on pregnancy benefits discriminated against
him.' 6 This action found support in the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.' 7 The company reacted by seeking an injunction against
the EEOC's implementation and enforcement of the "unauthorized" guide12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
13. 680 F.2d at 1247.
14. 667 F.2d at 451.
15.

667 F.2d at 449. The company's hospitalization and medical-surgical insurance plan ex-

tended coverage to spouses and unmarried children between the ages of 14 days and 19 years.
The benefits included the full cost of a hospital room for up to 120 days, and also included 100%
of the first $750 and 80% of the excess for other hospital and medical expenses while hospitalized,
for a maximum of 120 days. As for maternity benefits for an employee's spouse, the plan provided
full coverage for physician's charges, but limited coverage of hospital charges for an uncomplicated delivery to $500. Id.
16. 667 F.2d at 449.
17. In 1979, the EEOC issued guidelines, in a question and answer format, interpreting the
PDA. The questions and answers concerning employees' dependents provide as follows:
21. Q. Must an employer provide health insurance coverage for the medical expenses
of pregnancy-related conditions of the spouses of male employees? Of the dependents of
all employees?
A. Where an employer provides no coverage for dependents, the employer is not
required to institute such coverage. However, if an employers' [sic] insurance program
covers the medical expenses of spouses of female employees, then it must equally cover
the medical expenses of spouses of male employees, including those arising from pregnancy-related conditions. But the insurance does not have to cover the pregnancy-related conditions of non-spouse dependents as long as it excludes the pregnancy-related
conditions of such non-spouse dependents of male and female employees equally.
22. Q. Must an employer provide the same level of health insurance coverage for the
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lines. 18 The EEOC responded with a complaint against the company, alleging
that the company's health plan was discriminatory. 19 The district court found
that the PDA applies only to employees and does not extend to employees'
dependents. 20 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the PDA applies to dependents. 2 1 On rehearing en banc, 22the
Fourth Circuit adopted the panel opinion and reversed the district court.
While appeal was pending in the Newport News decision, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the same issue in Lockheed. Lockheed's medical
benefit plan covered employees' dependents, but completely excluded any
pregnancy benefits.2 3 The district court found that Lockheed was entitled to
summary judgment "for the reasons set forth in Newport News."'24 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit, though aware of the Fourth Circuit's panel
decision revers25
ing the district court, affirmed the lower court's decision.
Although the courts reached different results, the positions of the EEOC
and the employers appeared the same in both cases. The EEOC contended
that a limitation on spousal pregnancy benefits discriminates against men because it provides a lesser compensation package for male employees than it
does for female employees: although a female employee receives full spousal
coverage, a male employee's spousal coverage is limited with respect to pregnancy benefits. 26 And since a distinction on the basis of pregnancy is a distinction on the basis of sex, the male employees' spouses, and27 therefore the
male employees, are discriminated against on the basis of sex.
The employers, Newport News Shipbuilding and Lockheed, argued that
pregnancy-related medical conditions of the spouses of male employees as it provides for
its female employees?
A. No. It is not necessary to provide the same level of coverage for the pregnancyrelated medical conditions of the spouses of male employees as for female employees.
However, where the employer provides coverage for the medical conditions of the
spouses of its employees, the level of coverage for pregnancy-related medical conditions
of
the spouses of male employees must be the same as the level of coverage for all other
medical conditions of the spouses of female employees.
For example, if the employer

covers employees for 100 percent of reasonable and customary expenses sustained for a
medical condition, but only covers dependent spouses for 50 percent of reasonable and
customary expenses for their medical conditions, the pregnancy-related expenses of the
male employees spouse must be coveraged at the 50 percent level.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1604 (1982).
18. 667 F.2d at 450.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 70-71.
21. 667 F.2d at 451.
22. 682 F.2d at 113.
23. 680 F.2d at 1245.
24. 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1209, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Two other district courts have
since considered the issue. In EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. and Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill.
1981), the court followed the Newport and Lockheed district court decisions. In EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982), decided after the reversal of Newport, the court
"under[took] its own analysis of the statute," but substantively followed the other district courts.
.d. at 156.
25. 680 F.2d at 1247. The court did note that the Fourth Circuit's panel opinion had been
scheduled for rehearing en banc. 680 F.2d at 1244 n.l.
26. 680 F.2d at 1245; 667 F.2d at 449.
27. 680 F.2d at 1245; 667 F.2d at 450.
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the PDA should not extend to spouses of employees, emphasizing that the Act
was originally enacted in reaction to the Gilbert decision and was therefore
intended to protect only women workers. With respect to spouses of employees, the companies argued, the Gilbert rationale remains intact, and the exclusion of pregnancy benefits is not sex discrimination. 28
Both circuit courts attempted to determine congressional intent underlying the PDA by examining the language of the statute.29 In Lockheed the
Ninth Circuit viewed the PDA as providing that the word "sex" is to be read
to mean "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition."' 30 Reading this
construction into Title VII, the court found that the PDA amends Title VII to
read that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
'discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation. . . because of such individual's.

. .

pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-

tion.' "31 The court concluded that this construction cannot be read to apply
to male employees. The court pointed to two phrases in the PDA that support
this construction: "'employment-related purposes'" and "'other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.' -32 These phrases
indicated to the court that the PDA applies only to employees. Unfortunately,
the court did not explain why the extension of benefits to dependents fails to
serve an "employment-related purpose." As for the phrase "other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work," the court presumably agreed with the dissenting opinion in Newport News: "To determine
whether a pregnant woman is being treated the same as some other person
work, the pregnant woman, by logiwho has the similar ability or inability to '33
cal necessity, must also be an employee."
The Fourth Circuit took a much broader approach to construction of the
PDA. The court did not read the PDA as providing that sex means pregnancy,
but instead construed the statute as providing that pregnancy disabilities are
within the meaning of the word "sex."'34 Rather than superimposing the PDA
onto Title VII, the court simply found that "there is nothing in the first clause
[of the PDA] to suggest that the definition [of sex] will vary depending upon
28. 680 F.2d at 1244-46; 667 F.2d at 450.
29. 680 F.2d at 1245; 667 F.2d at 450-51. Inquiries into the meaning of a statute begin with
an examination of the language contained in the statute. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756

(1975).
30. 680 F.2d at 1245.
31. Id. (Quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis by
the court)). The court could not really have meant that the PDA substituted "pregnancy" for
"sex" in Title VII. The PDA expressly provides that "sex" includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy. Furthermore, such a construction would make Title VII a statute that protects only against

pregnancy discrimination. The only reasonable reading of the Ninth Circuit opinion assumes that

the court intended its statements to be limited to the context in which they were employed--cases
involving the PDA.
32. 680 F.2d at 1245 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
33. 667 F.2d at 452. Judge Hall, dissenting in Newport News, viewed this single phrase as
issue determinative. Id. Judge Widener and Judge Chapman joined in Judge Hall's dissent at the
en banc hearing. 682 F.2d at 114.
34. See 667 F.2d at 450.
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the employment status of the pregnant women."3 5s As for the phrase "employment-related purpose," the court noted that the extension of benefits to
spouses of employees serves an employment-related purpose just as does the
extension of benefits to the employees themselves. 3 6 The court construed the
statutory phrase "ability or inability to work" as denoting disability and not as
requiring that the spouse must be an employee of the employer providing the
coverage. 37 The court further observed that the PDA refers to "'other persons
not so affected,'" rather than to "'other employees not so affected.' "38
After their grammatical exploration of the PDA, both circuit courts attempted to determine congressional intent by examining the PDA's legislative
history.3 9 The Ninth Circuit relied primarily on the following passage from
the Senate Committee Report:
Questions were raised in the committee's deliberations regarding
how this bill would affect medical coverage for dependants of employees, as opposed to employees themselves. In this context it must
be remembered that the basic purpose of this bill is to protect women
employees; it does not alter the basic principles of title VII law as
regards sex discrimination. Rather, this legislation clarifies the definition of sex discrimination for title VII purposes. Therefore the
would be determined on
question in regard to dependents' benefits
40
the basis of existing title VII principles.
Relying on this statement, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the purpose of
the PDA was to protect women employees, and that existing Title VII principles-unaltered by the PDA-should be applied to resolve the question of
dependents' benefits.4 ' The court reasoned that Gilbert announced one of Title VII's basic principles: for discrimination to be gender-based, the line between groups must be drawn strictly between males and females. 42 Since the
Gilbert Court had already applied this "basic principle" to pregnancy benefit
exclusions and had determined that such exclusions were not gender-based
discrimination, that result necessarily applies to dependents. 43 In essence,
then, the court found that the PDA did not alter Gilbert's rationale, but merely
provided a narrow exception to Gilbert for female employees.
35. Id.
36. Id. The extension of benefits to spouses has been considered a fringe benefit to the employee for Title VII purposes. See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981)

(employer's health insurance plan that provided coverage for spouses only if the employee earned
more than 50% of the combined income violated Title VII since it disproportionately deprived
female employees of spousal benefits). See also Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 n.14 (1978) (insurance benefits for spouses included in employee benefit
package for Title VII purposes).
37. 667 F.2d at 450-51.
38. Id. at 451 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); emphasis by the court).
39. See 680 F.2d at 1245; 667 F.2d at 451. The legislative history of a statute includes committee reports and floor discussions. See Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639-42
(1967); Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390-95 (1950).
40. S.REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977).
41. 680 F.2d at 1246.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1247.
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The Fourth Circuit approached the legislative history of the PDA very

differently. The court acknowledged congressional references to protecting

"women workers" or "pregnant employees." 44 In response, the court pointed
out that the two senators who specifically addressed the issue of dependents'
benefits thought that the PDA would apply.45 Like the Ninth Circuit, the
44. 667 F.2d at 451. Some of the passages that reflect a purpose to protect female employees
are as follows:
mhis bill is simply corrective legislation, designed to restore the law with respect to
pregnant women employees to the point where it was last year, before the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilbert .... This approach represents only basic fairness for em-

ployees who become pregnant .... [W]e can no longer in this country legislate with
regard to women workers on the basis of outdated stereotypes and myths.
123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (1977).

"The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees
on the basis of their ability or inability to work." H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4752.
"H.R. 6075 was introduced to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to
reflect the commonsense view and to ensure that working women are protected against all forms
of employment discrimination based on sex." H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4751.
"This bill would require that women disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth or other related
medical conditions be provided the same benefits as those provided other disabled workers." H.R.
REP. No. 948,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749,4753.
See also supra text accompanying note 43, and infra note 49.
45. See 667 F.2d at 451. Senator Bayh, one of the sponsors ofthe Senate bill that became the
PDA, stated:
There remains the question, however, of whether dependents of male employees must
receive full maternity coverage if the spouses of female employees are provided complete
medical coverage. While it is difficult to second-guess the courts, I feel that the history of
sex discrimination cases under the 14th amendment in addition to previous interpretations of the Title VII regulations relating to the treatment of dependents will require that
if companies choose to provide full coverage to the dependents of their female employees, then they must provide such complete coverage to the dependents of their male
employees.
123 CONG. REc. 29,642 (1977), cited in 667 F.2d at 451 n.3.
Senator Cranston, a cosponsor of the legislation, stated:
When the Human Resources Committee considered how S.995 would affect medical
coverage for dependents of employees, the question was raised about the obligation of an
employer to pay for the pregnancy-related medical expenses of spouses of employees.
The committee presumed that most comprehensive medical plans do cover dependents
and that it was unlikely that any comprehensive plan covering spouses would cover husbands of women employees but not wives of male employees. Thus, the committee did
not directly answer the question of whether such plans would be discriminatory under
title VII.
Mr. President, I would like to express for the record my own view that such a plan
would indeed be discriminatory, and would be prohibited by the title VII sex discrimination ban.
123 CONG. REc. 29,663 (1977), cited in 667 F.2d at 451 n.3.
The Ninth Circuit treated these statements as personal opinions of the speakers rather than as
statements reflecting congressional intent. 680 F.2d at 1245 n.2. The court further noted that
while Mr. Sarasin, a supporter of the House bill, expressed the view that such a plan would be
discriminatory, he then stated, "I don't think that this is the intent, but I don't see how you can
read it any other way." Id.
There was also a conversation between Senator Hatch and Senator Williams that suggests the
PDA would apply only to pregnant female employees. Senator Williams, however, was discussing
the bill in the context of income maintenance plans. Since such plans replace lost wages of disabled employees, the discussion is irrelevant to dependents' medical expenses. Senator Hatch
appears not to have drawn the distinction between income maintenance plans and medical insurance coverage. 123 CONG. REC. 29,644 (1977).
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court considered a passage from the Senate Committee Report that suggested
the issue was left unanswered. 4 6 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however, the
Fourth Circuit refused to resolve the issue by considering the reach of Title
VII prior to the enactment of the PDA: "If the Senate Committee thought the
question would be resolved in subsequent litigation, the statute to be applied
surely would be the statute as it existed at the time the operative facts developed." 47 As for the PDA's effect on Gilbert, the court stated: "We cannot read
the statute so narrowly as to overturn the specific holding in Gilbert without
affecting the reasoning upon which that holding was based. 48 The court concluded that the new statute indicates a purpose to equate distinctions based on
49
pregnancy with distinctions based on sex.
Thus, the circuit courts' analyses diverged at two main points. First, the
Ninth Circuit found that the wording of the statute indicated congressional
intent to protect only female employees, while the Fourth Circuit found that
the PDA can be read to apply to all employment situations. Looking only to
the language of the PDA, either interpretation is reasonable. The PDA is too
broadly written to apply only to female employees, but too narrow to include
employees' dependents. On its face, the PDA applies to all individuals,
whether male or female, and simply provides that sex discrimination includes
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. On the other hand, the specific language of the PDA supports an implication that the statute refers only to women employees. In any event, it is apparent from the legislative history that
Congress left the issue open.5 0 Yet the Ninth Circuit found that the Act's
t
language revealed that Congress intended to limit the PDA to employees. 5
The second and most important difference in the courts' analyses is their
view of the PDA's effect on the Gilbert decision. Both courts agreed that the
issue was left open, to be decided on "existing" or "basic" Title VII princi46. 667 F.2d at 451. The court reproduced the passage in full:
"It was suggested before this committee that an effect of Title VII, once this bill was

enacted, would be to require that if the maternity costs of women employees were paid
under a medical plan, the similar costs for wives of male employees would also have to
be covered, whether or not the employer provided any other coverage for dependents.
This suggestion is incorrect. This bill would not mandate that women dependents be
compared with women employees, or that male employees with pregnant wives be compared with women employees themselves pregnant.
"On the other hand, the question of whether an employer who does cover dependents, either with or without additional cost to the employee, may exclude conditions
related to pregnancy from that coverage is a different matter. Presumably because plans
which provide comprehensive medical coverage for spouses of women employees but not
spouses of male employees are rare, we are not aware of any Title VII litigation concerning such plans. It is certainly not this committee's desire to encourage the institution of
such plans. If such plans should be instituted in the future, the question would remain
whether, under Title VII, the affected employees were discriminated against on the basis
of their sex as regards the extent of coverage for their dependents."
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977)).
47. 667 F.2d at 451.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 40 & 46 and accompanying text.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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ples. 52 From this premise, however, the courts moved in separate directions.

The Fourth Circuit viewed the PDA as overruling the Gilbert decision and
proceeded to apply the "new" statute to resolve the issue. The Ninth Circuit,
on the other hand, found that the PDA was meant only to provide a narrow
exception to Gilbert for female employees; outside the realm of female employees, Gilbert is alive and well.
There are a number of problems with the Ninth Circuit's analysis. In
support of its conclusion that the PDA was meant to apply only to female
employees, the court relied on a statement in the Senate Report that the basic
purpose of the legislation was to protect women employees.5 3 Indeed, there is
no doubt that congressional concern centered upon female employees.5 4 This
concern, however, does not necessarily limit the scope of the statute. For example, there are many statements in previous Title VII history that voice concern for blacks, minorities, and women, 55 but there is no question that Title
VII also protects whites and men.5 6 Although the motivation for forbiding
employment discrimination may be past practices that discriminate against
certain groups, the scope of Title VII has not been limited to those groups.
Accordingly, congressional concern for one group is little justification for allowing the same discriminatory practice against a second group.
A second problem with the Ninth Circuit's argument is its assumption
that the Gilbert analysis is one of the "basic principles" of Title VII that should
be applied to dependents.5 7 By making this assumption, the court effectively
decided the issue without considering whether Congress meant for Gilbert to
be applied at all. Contrary to the court's belief that Gilbert should resolve the
issue, there is ample legislative history that suggests Congress rejected both the
result and the rationale of Gilbert.58 For example, the Senate Report cited two
52. See 680 F.2d at 1246; 667 F.2d at 451.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
54. See supra note 44.
55. See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2393-94; 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).

56. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (white employee may
allege race discrimination under Title VII); Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th
Cir. 1976) (male employee challenged retirement benefits); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d
Cir. 1975) (male employee may allege sex discrimination in retirement benefits), rev'd on other
grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (male
challenged company's policy of using only females for flight attendants), cert.denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
58. The following passages from the PDA's legislative history reject Gilbert's conclusion that
pregnancy-based distinctions are not sex based:
This bill is intended to make plain that, under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
discrimination based on pregnancy, child-birth, and related medical conditions is discrimination based on sex. Thus, the bill defines sex discrimination, as proscribed in the
existing statute, to include these physiological occurrences peculiar to women; it does not
change the application of title VII to sex discrimination in any other way.
S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1977).
[T]he bill rejects the view that employers may treat pregnancy and its incidents as sui
generis, without regard to its functional comparability to other conditions.
S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
This bill became necessary in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert.. . which
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passages from the dissenting opinions in Gilbert that
correctly expressed both the principle and the meaning of Title VII.
As Mr. Justice Brennan stated: "Surely it offends commonsense to
suggest.

. .

that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not,

at the minimum, strongly 'sex related.'" Likewise, Mr. Justice Stevens stated that, "(b)y definition, such a rule discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become 5 pregnant
which
9
primarily differentiates the female from the male."
These statements attack the heart of the Gilbert rationale and indicate a complete rejection of the logic of the decision. Thus, there is evidence that Congress disagreed with Gilbert's finding that a pregnancy exclusion "is not a
gender based discrimination at all" 60 and found that the Gilbert result offended common sense. It is thus difficult to believe that Congress, by stating
that dependents' benefits would be determined on the basis of existing Title
VII principles, was suggesting that the Gilbert rationale should resolve the
issue.
There is a second reason Congress could not have intended that the courts
should resolve the issue with the Gilbert analysis. Both circuit courts agreed
that Congress did not resolve the dependents' benefits issue, but left it open for
later decision by the courts.61 If the issue was intended to remain an open one,
Gilbert could not have been considered controlling, for if Congress viewed
Gilbert as one of the basic Title VII principles to be used in resolving the issue,
there would be no question that dependents' pregnancies could be excluded
from an employer's insurance coverage.
The question remains as to what Congress meant by "basic principles of
Title VII"' 62 if it did not mean the Gilbert rationale. The meaning of this
phrase becomes apparent when one considers the difference between coverage
for employees and dependents. With female employees, any special limitation
on pregnancy related coverage is discriminatory since the female receives less
coverage than her male counterpart. Limitations on dependents' coverage,
however, are not necessarily discriminatory, because not all special limitations
result in differential benefits for male and female employees. For instance, an
employer is not required to cover an employee's dependents to the same extent
held that the exclusion of pregnancy and related conditions from otherwise comprehen-

sive disability insurance plans did not constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII. This interpretation of Title VII was not in keeping with the original congressional
intent and enactment of legislation to clarify the intent of Congress to prohibit preg-

nancy discrimination became imperative.
124 CONG. REc. 36,818 (1978).
[When an employer's plan provides protection in the event of virtually every conceivable disability but one, and that one can affect only women, it is an inescapable conclusion that such a plan by definition discriminates on the basis of sex.
123 CONG. REc. 4137 (1977). See also infra text accompanying note 59.
59. S.REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
60. 429 U.S. at 136.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 & 46.

62. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
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as the employee himself. 63 As long as all dependents are covered to the same
extent, the employees receive equal treatment. Furthermore, an employer
could provide dependent children with full coverage but completely exclude
dependent children's pregnancy benefits. 64 Again, the male and female employees receive equal compensation packages for their dependents. The issue,
then, is whether male and female employees receive equal treatment, and "basic Title VII principles," rather than the PDA, resolve each particular situation
with respect to dependents.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the PDA altered it from a statute
clarifying the meaning of sex discrimination as used in Title VII to a very
narrow statute protecting only female employees. This construction produces
a rather anamolous result: for women employees, discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of sex; for employees' spouses,
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy "'is not a gender-based discrimination at all.' "65 The Fourth Circuit, rather than strangling the PDA with the
Gilbert decision, viewed the PDA as an integral part of Title VII, and took a
fresh look at the reach of the amended Title VII. In so doing, the court
reached a clear and logically consistent
result: distinctions based on preg66
nancy are distinctions based on sex.
Once the PDA is read as equating pregnancy with sex for all Title VII
purposes, there is no question that a pregnancy exclusion is per se discriminatory under basic Title VII principles. The female employee receives full
spousal coverage, while the male employee's spousal coverage is limited.
Since this pregnancy limitation is a sex based limitation, the male receives less
complete coverage solely because of his sex.
While the Ninth Circuit's legal analysis is open to criticism, there are equitable considerations that underlie, and seem to justify, the court's holding.
Although Congress may have decided that equality of employment opportunity requires that pregnant workers be treated as other disabled persons, there
is no compelling reason to do the same for employees' wives. Pregnancy is to
a large extent a voluntary condition, not a disease or illness. But this argument loses much of its force when the employer has already decided to insure
dependents of employees. Assuming that all employers who cover dependents
also cover employees, the post-PDA female employee is already covered for
pregnancy expenses. Viewing employee and spouse as a family unit, the male
employee sees that his female coworker's family is covered for all medical
63. See supra note 17.
64. See id. Judge Wright, specially concurring in Lockheed, felt that the issue was whether
the male and female health benefit plans were equivalent. Since the legislative history expressly

left the issue open, he believed that neither the PDA nor Gilbert answered the question. He
concluded that since a male employee must bear the cost of his spouse's pregnancy and a female
employee must bear the cost of her "daughter's" pregnancy, the plans provided equal coverage.
680 F.2d at 1247-48 (Wright, J., concurring). This argument disregards the fact that a male employee must bear the cost of his spouse's pregnancy and his child's pregnancy, while the female
employee must cover only the costs of her child's pregnancy.
65. See Lockheed, 680 F.2d at 1246 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136).
66. 667 F.2d at 451.
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expenses, including those resulting from pregnancy. As for his own family,
there is a glaring exception to the coverage he receives from the employer.
Although the extent of a wife's coverage does not have to match the employee's coverage, to exclude completely coverage for just one medical expense, for only the male employee's family, solely on the basis of the
employee's sex, is patently discriminatory.
The issue presented in Lockheed and Newport News concerns an important right for the male employee, his wife, and his family. In a wider context,
its resolution also affects the legality of pregnancy discrimination throughout
Title VII law. The two circuit courts that have considered whether the PDA
applies only to female employees have reached opposite results. This discrepancy is based on the courts' different views of the purpose of the PDA, which
in turn are based on inconsistent interpretations of the statutory wording and
the legislative history.
The Fourth Circuit analysis appears to be the better reasoned approach.
The court recognized that the ambiguous wording of the PDA was not intended to resolve the issue. Although individual statements within the legislative history can be construed as supporting each court's decision, when
Congress spoke directly to the issue, it expressly stated that it was leaving the
issue unanswered. The question then becomes whether the analysis of the
Supreme Court in Gilbert should resolve the issue. The Ninth Circuit assumed
that it should. The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, viewed the PDA as
overruling Gilbert's finding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination. This result is supported by Congress' express and uncontroverted disagreement with Gilbert's "offensive" result and Congress' position that the issue
is still open and thus was not previously answered by the Gilbert decision. It is
also supported by the clear and consistent result that it reaches: pregnancy is
related to an individual's sex, and pregnancy discrimination is therefore sex
discrimination. The view of the Fourth Circuit is sound because it provides
not only equal treatment of employees, but also equitable treatment. Accordingly, future courts considering the issue should follow the Fourth Circuit: if
an employer chooses to extend insurance coverage to dependents, a special
limitation on spousal pregnancy benefits violates both the principle and the
meaning of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
KENT JOHN MCCREADY

